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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the Trial court err in granting summary judgment 
despite extraneous evidence that Mine and Mill and Charter did not 
intend their Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease dated 
February 11, 1992 to represent their full, complete and integrated 
agreement? 
2. Assuming for sake of argument that the Ernest Money 
Receipt was an integrated agreement is it ambiguous so that 
extraneous evidence should have been considered by the trial court 
concerning whether the parties intended the Ernest Money Receipt to 
be binding upon them? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991). The appellate Court accords the trial court's legal 
conclusions regarding the contract no deference but reviews them 
for correctness. AOK Lands. Inc. v. Shand. Morahan & Company, 860 
P.2d 924 (Utah 1993). Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991). The reviewing Court considers the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and will affirm only if there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact or if, 
accepting the facts as contended for by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine 
4 
issue of fact exists where, based on the facts and the record, 
reasonable minds could differ. West One Trust Company v. Morrison, 
221 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mine and Mill brings this appeal to obtain reversal of 
the trial court's $132,202.55 summary judgment grant in Charter's 
favor based on the court's finding, an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Lease, as the final, complete and integrated agreement of 
the parties to lease commercial property at 5914 South 350 West, 
Murray, Utah, despite evidence that the parties did not intend it 
as their integrated agreement and ambiguity on the face of the 
Earnest Money Receipt. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. Charter filed a Complaint against Mine and Mill on 
May 5, 1992 which was subsequently served upon Mine and Mill. 
(Record, Page 2). 
2. Mine and Mill filed an Answer to the Complaint on 
May 29, 1992. (Record, Page 40). 
3. Charter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with 
supporting memoranda and affidavit on March 24, 1993. (Record, Page 
85) . 
4. Mine and Mill filed a Memorandum in Opposition on 
April 12, 1993 (Record, Page 118) with the supporting affidavit of 
Ashok Patwardhan dated April 5, 1993. (Record, Page 134). 
5. On April 19, 1993, Charter filed a Motion to Strike 
paragraphs 13 through 17 of the Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan, 
Paragraphs 4 through 54 and 56 through 62 of Defendant's Memorandum 
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in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record, 
Page 142) and filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 16, 1993. 
6. Mine and Mill filed its Motion in Opposition to 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan and Certain 
Paragraphs of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition (Record, Page 
154), and a Request for Hearing (Record, Page 170). 
Disposition in Lower Court 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike 
of Charter came before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, District 
Court Judge for hearing on Monday, October 18, 1993. 
2. After hearing arguments of counsel for the parties, 
the Court took the matter under advisement and on October 27, 1993 
entered its minute entry granting Charter's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, denying Charter's Motion to strike and directing Charter 
to prepare an appropriate order reflecting the Court's ruling 
(Record, Page 176). 
3. The Court entered Summary Judgment against Mine and 
Mill in the form prepared by Charter for $132,202.55 on November 
24, 1993 (Record, Page 225). 
Statement of Facts 
A statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review is as follows: 
1. On or about February 11, 1992 Ashok Patwardhan as 
president of Mine and Mill Engineering Inc. signed an "Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Lease" (Record, Page 8) in the form 
prepared by Charter along with two separate addendum/counter offers 
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("Earnest Money Receipt")• 
2. The Earnest Money Receipt states: 
a. "First months rent plus security deposit in the 
amount of the last month's rent payable upon 
signing final lease agreement." (Record, Page 
8). 
b. "Within 10 days after tender of a firm lease 
prepared by landlord in a form consistent with 
the above provisions containing other 
customary and reasonable general provisions, 
the parties agree to execute a written lease 
which will supersede and abrogate this 
agreement. (Record, Page 8). 
c. "It is understood and agreed that the terms 
listed in this receipt constitute the entire 
preliminary contract between the tenant and 
landlord, and that no verbal statement made by 
anyone relative to this transaction shall be 
construed to be part of this transaction 
unless incorporated in writing herein." 
(Record, Page 8). 
d. "May go up to 9,000 S.F." (Record, Page 9). 
e. "Tenant agrees to pay in addition to the 
rental amount, the amount of **$1,000.00 
per month to landlord for the term of this 
lease to cover landlordfs investment to this 
extent. 
•^negotiable" (Record, Page 9). 
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f. "Rent to begin at time of occupancy." (Record, 
Page 10). 
g. Changes were made to the addenda to the Earnest 
Money Receipt with the initials "A. P." but no 
initials appear from a representative of 
Charter. (Record, Page 10). 
3. At the time they signed the Earnest Money Receipt, 
Mr. Patwardhan for Mine and Mill Engineering and Charter's agent 
agreed that the Earnest Money Receipt was just a formality showing 
the potential interest of Mine and Mill Engineering in the 
building. The parties agreed that it was not binding on Mine and 
Mill Engineering in the event that two other parties, Precision 
Systems Engineering ("PSE") and Environ, decided not to sign it as 
well; that it was necessary to enter into initial negotiations for 
the lease or purchase of the building and that any final agreement 
would be subject to negotiation and approval by all three parties 
as tenant. (Record, Pages 134-139). 
4. As contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt, 
Plaintiff prepared a "firm lease" agreement titled "Commercial and 
Industrial Lease." This lease was presented to and signed by 
Ashok Patwardhan as president of Mine and Mill Engineering with the 
same understanding that it would not become effective until and 
unless it was signed by Precision System Engineering and Environ 
Company L. C. who were also named as Lessees under the Commercial 
and Industrial Lease. (Record, Page 3 Paragraph 5, Page 13-28, 
Pages 134-139). 
5. The trial court refused to consider the events 
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surrounding the execution and purported delivery of the Earnest 
Money Receipt and the Commercial and Industrial Lease. It held the 
Earnest Money Receipt "clear and unambiguous." The lower court 
granted Charter's Motion for Summary Judgment for $132,202.55 plus 
additional damages incurred after April 1, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Application of the parol evidence rule requires an 
initial factual determination by the Court that an integrated 
writing exists intended by the parties to represent their full, 
complete and final agreement. The finder of fact must consider 
extraneous evidence when deciding if the parol evidence rule 
applies. An agreement considered by the parties to be interim or 
preliminary is not an integrated writing. Where parties execute 
two documents in the course of the same transaction that concern 
the same subject matter, the court must read both together to 
determine the intent of the parties to enter an integrated 
agreement. 
Here Charter prepared the Commercial and Industrial 
lease as contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt. The parties 
executed it. The court apparently ignored it in entering JSummary 
Judgment against Mine and Mill. Evidence concerning the binding 
effect of the parties1 signature to a document goes to their intent 
to enter an integrated contract. The parol evidence rule does not 
apply to the exclusion of such evidence because a fact issue exists 
whether the parties entered into an integrated agreement. 
The trial court found that the Earnest Money Agreement 
signed by the parties was "clear and unambiguous" (Record, Page 
225) . A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used are 
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insufficient because the contract may be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings. The Earnest Money Receipt contemplates 
a "firm lease" to follow. It refers to the Earnest Money as a 
"preliminary contract." Rent is payable only upon signing the 
final lease or taking possession of the property. The Earnest 
Money Receipt contains changes initialed by Mine and Mill but not 
by Charter. One could plausibly construe all of these provisions 
to mean that the parties did not intend the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Lease to form their final agreement. Other provisions 
may plausibly be construed to have a contrary meaning. The Earnest 
Money Receipt is ambiguous on its face. 
Considering both the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Lease and the subsequently executed Commercial and Industrial Lease 
as the documents making up the transaction, the agreement is 
ambiguous. The Earnest Money Receipt does not specifically refer 
to parties other than Mine and Mill Engineering and Charter. The 
Commercial and Industrial Lease clearly refers to other parties 
necessary to the Agreement. Viewing the two documents together, 
they have contrary meanings and are ambiguous. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment 
Despite Evidence that Mine and Mill and Appellee Did Not 
Intend their Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease to 
Represent Their Full Complete, and Integrated Agreement 
A. Before the Parol Evidence Rule can apply to execute 
extraneous evidence there must be an integrated 
writing. 
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) the trial court granted the motion for summary 
judgment of Colonial Leasing. The Trial court rejected Larsen 
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Bros.f argument that the lease was really a security agreement 
subject to the requirements in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code relating to the disposition of collateral and that Colonial 
was precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
In discussing the parol evidence rule, the Supreme Court 
stated at pages 486-487: 
The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude evidence of 
terms in addition to those in a written integrated 
agreement tf[T]he rule operates in the absence of fraud to 
exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Union 
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). See 
also Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 683 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 
261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972); Corbin, The Parol 
Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 609 (1944). Because the 
parol evidence rule applies only if the writing was 
intended by the parties to represent the full and 
complete agreement of the parties, the trial court must 
first determine whether the writing was intended to be an 
integrated agreement. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665; Eie, 
638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog Marina, 28 Utah 2d at 266, 501 
P.2d at 270. In some cases, it will be necessary for a 
trial judge to rule on the issue of integration as a 
preliminary or foundational matter. See Halloran-Judge 
Trust Co. V. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (1927). 
In this case, the trial judge did not expressly rule 
whether the purported lease was an integrated writing. 
Since the affidavits raise a factual issue as to whether 
the contract was in fact intended to be integrated, the 
trial judge will need to hear the evidence on that issue. 
Indeed, the need for parol evidence is also suggested by 
the nature and terms of the lease itself and the 
surrounding circumstances. 
It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous 
because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular 
terms, it is subject to parol evidence as to what the 
parties intended with respect to those terms. Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). See also 
Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery Co., 29 Wash. 
App. 725, 631 P.2d 389 (1981). We hold that that rule 
also applies where the character of the written agreement 
itself is ambiguous even though its specific terms are 
not ambiguous, [citations omitted]. 
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The Court concluded that: 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and 
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 658 P. 2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 
1983) . If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement 
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms 
of the agreement is to be determined by the jury. Id.; 
Amiacs Interwest. Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 
55 (Utah 1981). 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., supra at 
488. 
In the instant case, the trial judge did not expressly 
rule whether the Earnest Money Receipt was an integrated writing. 
The Court's Order states, M . • . the Earnest Money Agreement 
signed by the parties was clear and unambiguous, . . . " (Record, 
Pages 225-226). The Summary Judgment does not address whether the 
Agreement was intended by the parties to be their "full and 
complete agreement." (Record, Pages 225-228). Ashok Patwardhan's 
Affidavit raises factual issues as to whether the Earnest Money 
Receipt was in fact intended to be the integrated agreement of the 
parties. (See Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan, Record, Pages 164-
169, Paragraphs 8-17). The trial judge should hear evidence on 
that issue. 
The nature and the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt 
itself also suggest the need for parol evidence. (Record, Page 8) . 
The Earnest Money Receipt states on its face, "First monthfs rent 
plus Security Deposit in the amount of the last month's rent 
payable upon signing final lease agreement". The second addenda 
states "Rent to begin at time of occupancy." (Record, Page 10). It 
calls itself a "Preliminary Contract" and provides that a "firm 
lease" setting forth all of the agreements between the parties 
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would be executed later (Record, Page 8). According to the first 
addenda, the amount of space covered is uncertain and the 
additional rent for improvements to be made by landlord is 
"negotiable" (Record, Page 9) . All of these provisions suggest 
that the parties did not execute the Earnest Receipt as their "full 
and complete agreement" and did not intend it to be their 
integrated agreement. 
B. An interim or preliminary agreement is not an 
integrated writing. 
In Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638 P. 2d 1190 (Utah 
1981) the parties entered what they characterized as an "Interim 
Agreement" with the parties' attorneys to prepare their final 
agreement. The "Interim Agreement" set forth the amount to be paid 
per ambulance service call. The Supreme Court found that the 
Interim Agreement was not the final agreement between the parties 
by its very terms. The Court found that the trial court properly 
considered parol evidence at trial. That evidence supported the 
claim the parties intended their Interim Agreement as a tentative 
agreement. 
In Eie as in this case, the writing referred to final 
documentation to follow. 
The Earnest Money Receipt states: 
"Within ten days after tender of firm lease prepared by 
Landlord in a form consistent with the above provisions 
and containing other customary and reasonable general 
provisions, the parties agree to execute a written lease 
which will supersede and abrogate this agreement (Record, 
Page 8)." 
In Eie as in the present case# the writing showed on its face that 
it was interim or preliminary to a final agreement by the parties 
(Pages 8-10). The Earnest Money Receipt states, "It is understood 
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and agreed that the terms written in this receipt constitute the 
entire Preliminary Contract between the tenant and landlord, . • ." 
(Record, Page 8). The Earnest Money Receipt indicates on its fact 
that it was not intended as the final agreement of the parties and 
so the parol evidence rule does not apply. 
C. Where two documents are executed in the course of 
the same transaction and concern the same subject 
matter, both are read together to determine the 
rights of the parties. 
In Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 28 Utah 
2d 261 (1972) , the trial court found that the lease and employment 
contract bore a relationship to one another and should be 
considered as one agreement. Since the issue of whether the 
contracts should be integrated was a factual question, and that 
substantial evidence existed to support the determination of the 
trial judge, the Supreme Court sustained his finding. The trial 
court did not err in following the rule of law that two or more 
instruments executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at 
different times in the course of the same transaction, concerning 
the same subject matter, will be read and construed together to 
determine the respective rights and interests of the parties, 
although they do not in terms refer to each other. 
Here we have two agreements prepared in the course of the 
same transaction. One of these agreements refers to and 
contemplates the other. The trial court erred in not considering 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction to 
determine the integration issue. Charter prepared the document 
contemplated to be the final and complete expression of the 
parties1 agreement (Record, Page 3, Paragraph 5). By preparing the 
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Commercial and Industrial Lease Charter acknowledged that it did 
not consider the Earnest Money Receipt to be an integrated 
agreement. 
The Commercial and Industrial Lease drafted by Charter 
imposes obligations on both parties beyond those set forth in the 
"preliminary" Earnest Money Receipt. These include the obligation 
of the tenant to provide liability insurance at specified levels 
(Record, Pages 16-17, Paragraph III, 15), to pay for all property 
taxes, not just increases (Record, Page 15, Paragraph III, 8), and 
to increase the amount of space leased (Record, Page 13, Paragraph 
I) . The Commercial and Industrial Lease also imposes additional 
obligations on Charter including, but not limited to, the 
obligation to repair the roof for the first year (Record, Pages 14-
15, Paragraph III, 6). Most important, the "firm lease" 
contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt and set forth in the 
Commercial and Industrial Lease identifies all of the parties who 
would be tenants (Record, Page 5, Pages 13 and 20). These are fact 
issues and not the subject for summary judgment. 
D. Extraneous evidence concerning the binding effect 
of a signature to a document goes to the intent of 
the parties to enter an integrated contract. 
In Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985) the 
bank brought an action to recover on a promissory note. Defendants 
who had signed the note individually and personally answered that 
they did not intend their signatures to have the effect of 
personally binding them. The representatives of the bank promised 
them their signatures were for appearance only and the bank would 
not bring a collection action against them personally. The bank 
moved for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. 
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The Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material 
fact existed whether the parties intended an integrated note. These 
preclude summary judgment. The signatories were not as a matter of 
law foreclosed from asserting defenses based on fraud by their 
failure to use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof, or by 
their failure to allege each and every element of common law fraud. 
As in Union Bank, Mine and Mill presented evidence that 
Charter represented its president's signature would not bind it 
(Record, Pages 166-168, Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan, Paragraphs 
11, 13, 15, 16, and 17). The instant case is also similar to Union 
Bank in that the Court must first determine whether the parties 
intended their writing as an integration. 
In Cox v. Berrv 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575, the Court 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on other 
grounds but commented on some contentions made by the parties. 
Some parties urged that they were not bound by a hold harmless 
agreement because the signatures of some intended signers were 
never obtained. The Court observed that whether the parties 
signing the agreement were bound depended upon the agreement. If 
it appears that part of the consideration for signing required 
others to sign and be bound jointly with them, they have not 
entered into an agreement. The Court went on to observe that such 
uncertainties emphasize the necessity and propriety of trial and 
taking evidence as to the background and circumstances of the 
transaction in order to decide what the parties intended. Id. at 
579. 
Here, Mine and Mill presented evidence that the parties 
agreed it would not be bound unless PSE and Environ also entered 
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the lease. (Record, Pages 166-168)• 
Viewing the facts of this case in the light most 
favorable to appellant, the Earnest Money Receipt (Record, Page 8-
10) , the contemporaneous understandings surrounding execution of 
the agreements (Record, Pages 166-168), and the subsequent course 
of dealing by the parties (Record, Page 3, Paragraph 5 and Page 13) 
establish that they did not intend the Earnest Money Receipt to be 
the final and complete expression of their agreement. 
Here the Earnest Money Receipt itself contemplates 
further documentation. It is clear from the subsequent 
documentation prepared by Charter and the affidavit of the 
president of Mine and Mill that the other two entities sharing 
liability on the lease was a condition precedent to Mine and Mill 
being a party to the lease. The trial court should consider 
extrinsic evidence in determining whether the parties intended the 
Earnest Money Receipt to represent their full, complete and 
integrated agreement. Mine and Mill presented issues of material 
fact as the parties1 intent regarding the Earnest Money Receipt as 
an integrated contract. These fact issues preclude the grant of 
summary judgment. 
SECOND ARGUMENT 
Even if the Earnest Money Receipt Was An Integrated 
Contract it is Ambiguous So That Extraneous Evidence 
Should have been Considered By The Trial Court 
Concerning Its Effect 
A. A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used 
are insufficient because the contract may be 
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings. 
In West One Trust Co. v. Morrison. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(Utah App. 1993), a father and son acquired three pieces of real 
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property by warranty deed to them as "joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common." There was 
extrinsic evidence that the father and son were really dealing as 
partners and not as joint tenants. After the hearing, the trial 
court concluded that the three deeds conveying the property were 
clear and unambiguous on their face. The father and son held title 
to the properties as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship. The personal representative of the father's estate 
appealed the trial court's ruling arguing that the deeds did not 
demonstrate the party's true intent and that parol evidence was 
admissible to demonstrate a mutual mistake occurred in the case. 
The Court of Appeals stated: 
Exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist, however, 
when there is an issue as to whether the parties intended 
the writing as an integrated contract, and when "what 
appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement 
. . . may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake or the 
like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes 
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the 
writing." [Caption omitted] Therefore, parol evidence 
may be admissible to show mutual mistake, occurring 
"•when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they base their bargain.'" [Citation omitted] 
In addition, a mutual mistake theory may apply to 
instances where the parties misunderstood the legal 
effect of the words in a document and may result in 
reformation of a deed. "It is well settled that mistakes 
as to the legal effect of words used in a contract or 
deed, . . . are subject to reformation by the courts." 
(Id. at P. 13). 
The Court concluded: 
"Based on the foregoing, parol evidence is admissible to 
demonstrate that a mutual mistake resulted in a document 
which does not accurately reflect the intent of the 
parties. If the mutual mistake is established by clear 
and convincing evidence, a document may be reformed." Id. 
The Earnest Money Receipt states, 
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"Within ten days after tender of a firm lease prepared by 
a landlord in a form consistent with the above provisions 
and containing other customary and reasonable general 
provisions, the parties agree to execute a written lease 
which will supersede and abrogate this agreement. 
. . . It is understood and agreed that the terms written 
in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary 
Contract between the tenant and landlord, . . ." 
(emphasis added). (Record, Page 8). 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has determined that, 
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are 
insufficient in the sense that the contract may be 
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." 
(citations omitted). C. J. Realty, Inc.. v. Willey 758 
P. 2d 923 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Earnest Money Receipt contemplates a "firm lease" 
prepared by Charter in a consistent form (Record Page 8, Lines 36-
38) . One can easily understand this to mean the firm or binding 
lease. If the "firm lease" does follow, this contract language 
could plausibly be understood as intended by the parties to mean 
that the Earnest Money Receipt is not firm or binding. 
When the Earnest Money Receipt refers to a "Preliminary 
Contract" (Record, Page 8, Lines 41-42) one could plausibly 
understand Mine and Mill and Charter to intend the Earnest Money 
Receipt as introductory, initiatory, preceding, temporary, and 
provisional. The Earnest Money Receipt does not provide for 
payment of rent until all contemplated parties sign the "firm 
lease" or tenant occupies the premises (Record, Page 8, Lines 12-13 
and Page 10). These provisions could plausibly be understood to 
mean the parties intended that Mine & Mill have no obligation to 
pay until that time. The requirements of the Earnest Money Receipt 
could also plausibly be understood to mean that it does constitute 
some type of agreement between the parties as contended by Charter. 
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Since the Earnest Money Receipt uses insufficient words 
to express the meaning and intention of the parties and the 
contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings 
it is ambiguous. 
The Court of Appeals has stated, "If the contract is 
ambiguous, 'extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent must be 
received and considered in an effort to glean what the parties 
actually agreed to." West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, supra. 
at 929. 
B. If two documents making UP the transaction can be 
plausibly understood to have contrary meanings, the 
agreement is ambiguous. 
In Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991) the 
Supreme Court faced an assignment of the seller's interest in a 
contract to convey property documented by an agreement of 
assignment and a warranty deed. The Court had to decide whether 
the assignee of the seller's interest had an obligation to convey 
title of the property to the buyer after the buyer paid in full. 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment. The Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded. The analysis used by the Supreme Court is 
helpful and instructive. The Court set forth the applicable law as 
follows: 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties 
are controlling, [citation omitted] If the contract is 
in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from the 
words of the agreement, [citation omitted]. A court may 
only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful 
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or 
uncertain, [citation omitted]. A contract provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies, [citation 
omitted]. Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a 
question of law. Faulkner, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293. In this 
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case, the trial court granted the Winegars' motion for 
summary judgment. The only parol evidence offered came 
from the Froerers and wholly supported their position. 
We must therefore assume that the trial court found the 
contract unambiguous and must have thus disregarded the 
Froerers' evidence. We may uphold the trial court's 
ruling only if we agree that the contract was 
unambiguous. As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch, 
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977), we first 
examine the language of the instrument, according to it 
the weight and effect it shows the parties intended. If 
the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, parol evidence of 
the parties' intentions should be admitted. A motion for 
summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion 
is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a 
factual issue as to what the parties intended, [citation 
omitted]. 
Id. at 108. 
The Court then analyzed the two documents that made 
up the assignment agreement. It interpreted one as assigning the 
obligation to convey title while the other suggested a contrary 
intent. In its conclusion, the Court stated: 
It is not difficult to see how the trial court was 
tempted to "weigh" these competing interpretations to 
determine what effect to give this agreement. 
Unfortunately, weighing evidence is proper only when 
making findings of fact, not when determining questions 
of law in interpreting a contract on a motion for summary 
judgment. There is sufficient ambiguity regarding the 
intentions of the parties to this transaction that the 
trial court could not properly resolve this action in the 
Winegars' favor as a matter of law. We therefore reverse 
and remand this case for trial on the issue of intent. 
Id. at 111. 
As applied to the facts of this case, the summary 
judgment states that, "The earnest money agreement signed by the 
parties was clear and unambiguous." Therefore, this Court may 
uphold the trial court's ruling only if it agrees that the Earnest 
Money Receipt was unambiguous. It is also clear from the language 
of the trial court's order that it failed to consider the 
Commercial and Industrial Lease agreement prepared and tendered by 
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Plaintiff to be the "firm lease" between the parties. 
The Commercial and Industrial Lease agreement named "Mine 
and Mill Engineering, a Utah Corp., Precision Systems Engineering, 
a Utah Corp., Environ Company, a Utah Limited Company, as tenants 
to act as joint tenants with Mine and Mill Engineering acting as 
contracting agent for the tenants." (Record, Pages 13 and 20). 
Charter prepared and tendered the Commercial and Industrial Lease 
naming and providing for execution by all three. The Earnest Money 
Receipt contemplates that Charter would prepare and tender a "firm 
lease" which would supersede and abrogate the "Preliminary 
Contract" known as the Earnest Money Receipt. 
Following analysis of the Supreme Court in Winegar, there 
is an ambiguity in the Ernest Money Receipt viewed alone and in the 
documentation viewed as a whole. The Earnest Money Receipt only 
names Mine and Mill Engineering, Inc. as a tenant whereas the 
Commercial and Industrial Lease names PSE and Environ along with 
Mine and Mill Engineering, Inc. as tenants. One could plausibly 
understand it to mean that Mine and Mill Engineering was to be the 
only tenant. One could plausibly understand the Commercial and 
Industrial Lease to mean all three entities would share the space. 
Viewing the documents together they have contrary meanings and are 
ambiguous. 
The Earnest Money Receipt is ambiguous on its face. As 
stated above, it could be construed to obligate Mine and Mill to 
make payments only upon execution of the "firm lease" or upon 
occupancy. One could interpret it as the full and complete 
agreement of the parties. When such an ambiguity exists, the 
finder of fact must consider extraneous evidence to determine the 
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parties' true intent. When viewing the transaction as a whole, the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Commercial and Industrial Lease differed 
concerning whom the tenant would be. Consideration of extrinsic 
evidence is appropriate given such an ambiguity, 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the standard of appellate review to grants of 
summary judgment, the trial court erred in granting judgment 
without first considering extraneous evidence concerning the 
parties' intention whether the Earnest Money Receipt was their 
full, complete and integrated agreement. Before the Parol Evidence 
Rule can apply to exclude extraneous evidence, the trial court must 
make a preliminary ruling that an integrated writing exists. Mine 
and Mill has raised factual issues. The language of the Earnest 
Money Receipt, the course of dealing leading up to execution of the 
Earnest Money Receipt and the parties' subsequent course of dealing 
raises factual issues. Charter's preparation of the Commercial and 
Industrial Lease also raises factual issues. These all establish 
that the parties did not intend the Earnest Money Agreement as 
their integrated agreement. 
Even if the Earnest Money was an integrated agreement, it 
is ambiguous whether viewed alone or in connection with the 
subsequent commercial and industrial lease. The trial court should 
have considered extraneous evidence concerning the true intent of 
the parties. 
Applying the standard of appellate review to the issues 
of this case requires reversal of the trial court's order grating 
summary judgment and remand of this case for further proceedings. 
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Mine and 
23 
Mill, genuine disputes exist as to material issues of fact. 
Accepting the facts as contended by Mine and Mill, Charter is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The grant of Summary 
Judgment by the trial court was not appropriate because genuine 
issues of material fact exist. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mine and Mill 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
grant of Summary Judgment and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this J \^ day of May, 1994. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P. C. 
2Ca 
Jayne H.' Braunberger 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed postage prepaid on the 
/**" day of ,—-/t4-~y^— 1994, to the following: 
George A. Hunt 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. BOX 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
24 
